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ABSTRACT 
Since many decades, requirements engineering domain has seen 
significant enhancements towards adapting the security and risk 
analysis concepts. In this regard, there exist numerous security 
requirements engineering methodologies that support elicitation 
and evaluation of the security requirements. However, selecting a 
security requirements engineering methodology (SRE) for a given 
context of use often depends on a set of ad hoc criteria. In this 
paper, we propose a methodological evaluation methodology that 
helps in identifying the characteristics of a good SRE 
methodology. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Security and privacy~Security requirements   → Software
and its engineering~Requirements analysis
KEYWORDS 
Security requirements engineering, evaluation methodology 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Security requirements engineering (SRE) is continuously 
evolving as one of the challenging areas of research in the security 
domain. If the derived security requirements are not good then 
they could eventually risk inadequate protection of the critical 
system assets. Consequently, many organizations are compelling 
keen attention towards the efficient security and risk analysis 
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right from the earlier stages of SRE process. Currently, there exists 
numerous SRE methodologies that were integrated with the 
synthesis of security and risk related concepts and enhancements 
[1]–[5]. However, the question of which SRE methodology to 
choose for a given context remains an open question till date. 
We face this question in the context of the IREHDO2 research 
project. Our main objective in this project is to derive good 
security requirements aligned with business strategy as well as 
the risk control objectives, for aircraft networks. For this, we had 
to decide which of the existing methodologies is more suitable to 
derive security requirements for aircraft networks. In this regard, 
we considered different SRE methodologies focusing on security 
and risk analysis during early stages of RE process. In practice, 
majority of the existing SRE methodologies fall into three 
following categories: goal oriented [2], agent oriented [5] and 
problem frames oriented approaches [4]. The diversity of SRE 
methodologies has raised another question: How to evaluate 
which SRE methodology approach is more suitable to derive good 
network security requirements for aircraft systems? Accordingly, 
we started our study with two research questions: Q1: What are 
good security requirements? And Q2: what is a good security 
requirements engineering methodology? 
In a previous article [6], we presented an initiative work to 
address research question Q1. We surveyed the literature on the 
characteristic of good requirements and proposed a weaving 
methodology. It provides a consolidated view of the characteristic 
definitions proposed by 7 different as well as highlights the non-
consensus issue. In this article, we aim at addressing research 
question Q2, for which we propose a generic evaluation 
methodology. This methodology follows a requirement 
engineering-based approach. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides related works on the comparative studies for evaluating 
the SRE methodologies. Section 3 describes our proposed 
methodology. In section 4 we discuss on the highlighting aspects 
of our methodology. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 4. 
2 RELATED WORKS 
From a broad perspective, we classify the state-of-the-art of the 
SRE comparative studies into two categories based on their 
comparison strategies as: 1) integration of concepts, 2) criteria 
specific. This categorization seeks facilitating the understanding 
on the way the comparative studies have performed. 
2.1 Integration of concepts 
This category of works aims at analysing, to what extend do 
the methodologies support the integration of the security related 
concepts. 
N Mayer [7] provided a comparative study of the SRE 
methodologies based on a domain model consisting of 14 security 
concepts, categorized under three groups as asset-related, risk-
related and risk treatment related concepts. Fabian et al. [8] 
proposed a conceptual framework to support the comparative 
study of the existing SRE methodologies. When compared with 
Mayer’s modelling framework [7], this work highlights some 
similar concepts but was extended with granular security analysis 
concepts. K Beckers [9] provided an extension of the conceptual 
framework proposed by Fabian et al. [8], aligned with additional 
concepts concerning the privacy goals with respect to the 
confidentiality protection of the personal data while developing 
secure software. Munante et al. [10] provided a comparative study 
of the SRE methods emphasizing on the aspects related to security 
risk analysis and model-driven engineering. This work can be 
viewed as an extension of the previous works [7], [8]. Amina et al. 
[11] proposed a comparison framework to provide a systematic 
mapping of the reusable concepts and patterns within the existing 
SRE methodologies. 
2.2 Criteria Specific 
This category of works aims at analysing, to what extend do 
the methodologies fulfil a specific list of evaluation criteria. In 
below, we do not discuss in detail each list of criteria proposed by 
the respective authors, as our focus is only on analysing how the 
respective criteria list is claimed to be good enough to do the 
comparative study. 
Uzunov et al. [12] proposed a comparative analysis of security 
engineering methodologies using a list of 12 criteria. This work 
provides guidelines on the selection of methodologies upon their 
comprehensiveness, applicability and uniqueness from the 
perspective of industrial use. Jain et al. [13] proposed a 
comparison framework to support the comparative analysis of 
requirement engineering methodologies in deriving quality 
requirements. In this regard, 14 requirement engineering methods 
were evaluated against the guidelines and best practices of 
RE 
 
process as discussed in the international standard IEEE 1233[14]. 
Nhlabatsi et al. [15] proposed a comparative study of security 
requirements engineering approaches in order to evaluate the 
extent to which they can support the evolution of secure software 
during the change management process. Accordingly, the criteria 
addresses different perspectives such as the modularization, 
component architectures, change propagation and change impact 
analysis. Mead et al. [16], contrary to above works, provided a 
comparative analysis of the requirement elicitation techniques 
based on some criteria such as learnability, client acceptance and 
durability of the requirement elicitation techniques, tools support 
etc. In addition, this work highlighted the variability of criteria 
attributes in regards with the requirement engineering 
methodologies considered in general. 
2.3 State-of-the-art analysis 
Many interesting aspects were discussed in the related works. 
However they are not sufficient to evaluate the goodness of the 
SRE methodologies, due to various reasons such as: 
Issue A: None of the related works covered the whole SRE 
process in their comparative studies. Only limited works [7], [8], 
[16] have shown significant focus on security requirements 
analysis during the earlier stages. However, the SRE process 
subsumes additional activities to elicitation which are evaluation 
and documentation.
Issue B: Proposed evaluation criteria were either subjective or 
ad hoc and lack affirmation on why the criteria were good enough 
to be considered for the evaluation [12], [15], [16]. In addition, ad 
hoc selection of criteria for comparing and evaluating the SRE 
methodologies constrains the reusability and adaptability of the 
comparison strategies. 
Issue C: Finally, none of these comparative studies consider 
the perspectives of the security requirement engineers who will 
use the SRE methodology for deriving security requirements. 
3 OUR PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
We want to identify an ideal requirement engineering 
methodology for aircraft network security. In our discussion on 
the related works in section 2, the comparative studies were made 
specific to a context or based on some criteria. But how good are 
those criteria? Are they complete and correct? It is not only 
sufficient to acknowledge the significance of having some 
evaluation criteria, but also it is necessary to provide arguments 
on why and how the proposed criteria were good enough to 
consider. Therefore, existing comparative studies lack focus on 
asserting the correctness and reliable aspects of the proposed 
evaluation criteria (section 2.3). 
From a requirement engineering (RE) perspective, these 
evaluation criteria implicitly correspond to the high-level 
requirements of the SRE methodology. Thus, we headed to tackle 
the evaluation of SRE methodologies from the point of view of 
requirement engineering. Furthermore, instead of providing yet 
another comparative study specific to our SRE context (similar to 
the works in section 2), we are interested in developing a generic 
evaluation methodology independent from SRE context of use. 
3.1 The global picture of our SRE evaluation 
methodology 
In the philosophy of requirements engineering, the derived 
requirements target a future system which is called the system-
to-be [3]. Similarly, in our evaluation methodology, the target 
system is indeed the SRE methodology itself, which we want to 
choose (see Figure 1). To our convenience, henceforth we refer 
this target methodology as the SRE-Methodology-to-be. In order to 
choose a requirement engineering methodology, firstly one has to 
acquire knowledge on the target context in which requirement 
engineering is planned to perform[17]. Here the context we are 
referring concerns the actual RE context of the system-to-be in 
which the requirement engineers intend to use the SRE-
Methodology-to-be. This activity is called “understanding the 
problem context” in the jargon of RE domain[3]. Then, it is 
important to identify the stakeholders who are part of the security 
requirement engineering process in the target context (security 
requirement engineers, security analysts, etc). Taking into 
account the people who will use the SRE-Methodology-to-be is 
mandatory. Likely, this activity is called “identifying 
stakeholders” in the jargon of RE domain[3]. 
The next phase in a RE process is the requirements elicitation. 
In our context, the elicited requirement goals are the high-level 
characteristics of the SRE-methodology-to-be, which in turn 
become the evaluation criteria for the comparative study. Our 
evaluation methodology is built mainly upon the refinement of 
two research questions: Q1: what are good security requirements? 
And Q2: what is a good security requirement engineering 
methodology?  
The refinement of the research question Q1, addresses the 
quality aspects of derived requirements which in turn helps in 
reducing requirement errors [6]. When speaking of the quality of 
requirements, this aspect is independent to the SRE context. 
Likewise, the refinement of the research question Q2 addresses 
the applicable quality aspects of the requirement engineering 
methodologies which in turn helps in reducing performance 
errors of the methodology. Unlike Q1, research question Q2 is 
hooked up with the SRE context. In other terms, it enforces the 
requirement engineers to think what sort of features in an SRE 
methodology would be best suitable to their SRE context. 
Altogether, these questions form the core building blocks for 
eliciting requirements of the SRE-methodology-to-be. 
Accordingly, we elicit requirements of the SRE-methodology-
to-be based on the anticipated quality aspects of the security 
requirements as well the anticipated methodology features from 
the stakeholders (i.e., requirement engineers) objectives. We label 
the requirements of the SRE-methodology-to-be as RM. Figure 1 
projects the RE process of our evaluation methodology. Our 
methodology subsumes three steps: 1) Identifying problem 
context and eliciting initial characteristic goals, 2) Refining the 
characteristics goals into Requirements (RM), 3) Finally, evaluating 
the selected methodologies using the elicited requirements (RM). 
Accordingly, in the following we discuss the process steps of our 
methodology. 
Figure 1: Our Evaluation methodology 
3.2  Step1: Problem context and initial goals 
elicitation 
We explain the employment of our evaluation methodology 
approach by instantiating it to the context of our research project 
IREHDO2. Accordingly, the problem context of the SRE-
methodology-to-be is aircraft network security. Also, we 
interviewed different people from an aircraft manufacturer 
company who participate at different levels of the aircraft 
network security process from the definition of security 
requirements and risk analysis to the evaluation of the security 
requirements enforcement on aircraft networks. 
Eliciting requirements is a hard task. Especially, 
meetings/brainstorming with stakeholders must be controlled in 
order to be effective. In this regard, we propose to employ the 
elicitation technique introduced by SABSA[18], a business risk 
driven enterprise security architecture development methodology 
framework. The SABSA framework handles this elicitation issue 
by proposing a list of generic high-level business security 
concerns, called business attributes. These business attributes 
might lead to several interpretations. Interpretation of business 
attributes is refined for a specific problem context by a security 
architect who interacts with the business stakeholders. These 
business attributes guide the interaction during the elicitation 
phase. 
The list of 20 quality criteria characterizing good security 
requirements that we proposed in [6] is similar to business 
attributes in SABSA. Accordingly they constitute the generic 
high-level goals of the SRE-Methodology-to-be. As consequence, 
we have organized the 20 quality criteria in order to facilitate the 
elicitation of requirements RM. Due to the space limit, we only 
provide a sample of it in Figure 2. The first three columns contain 
a unique identifier, a quick definition and the synonyms found in 
the literature. The last column describes the quality criteria via a 
set of questions, each reflecting different perspectives of the 
respective criterion definitions. Suitably, we added this last 
column to make such different perspectives easily conveyable to 
all our stakeholders, in order to facilitate their understanding and 
capture multiple interpretations. Altogether, the 20 characteristic 
definitions subsume all the aspects of RE process such as 
elicitation (e.g., feasible) and evaluation (e.g., consistency), 
documentation (e.g., traceable) as well the stakeholder’s 
perspectives (e.g., comprehensibility). 
Figure 2: Sample of our SRE Requirements Elicitation Tool 
We used this quality criteria list (Figure 2) for initiating our 
discussion in meetings/interviews during the elicitation phase. 
Subsequently, we gathered requirements goals from security 
requirements experts, risk analysis and security assessors. These 
persons are the stakeholders who intend to use the SRE-
methodology-to-be in their context which is deriving aircraft 
network security requirements. This step solely focuses on 
conveying the true meaning of the characteristic definitions and 
collecting various perspectives from the stakeholders to find any 
missing aspects. This activity is known as “agree upon the 
anticipated features” in the conventional RE process. It also 
corresponds to the first procedural step “agree on definitions” of 
the SQUARE SRE methodology[1]. 
For example, let consider the adequacy criterion that could 
implicitly mean many things. According to NIST[19], adequate 
security results from “the reasoned sum of all system protections 
(both active and passive protections) for all system execution 
modes (e.g., initialization, operation, maintenance, training, 
shutdown); for all system states (e.g., secure, insecure, normal, 
degraded, recovery); and for all transitions that occur between 
system states and between system execution modes”. That means 
the SRE-methodology-to-be methodology should facilitate the 
security risk analyst to be able to capture all the dimensions of the 
protection states and modes efficiently[19]. 
Another example is the priority criterion. Priority of security 
requirements may vary based on the criticality of the operational 
contexts. While risk analysis is all about identifying security risks 
based on potential impacts of the security threats, prioritization 
of security goals is a fundamental prerequisite. Firesmith [20] has 
highlighted 13 diversified dimensions that could influence the 
prioritization aspects of the goals. That means, the SRE 
methodology should facilitate the security risk analysts to be 
able 
 
 
to explicitly identify the influencing factors from all such 
dimensions in order to accurately reason the prioritization. 
Likewise we have constructed the questionnaires to consolidate 
the perspectives and viewpoints from the various related works 
and international standards as we highlighted in our previous 
article [6]. 
Furthermore, similar to the business attributes proposed by 
SABSA, our quality criteria list is not fixed. It can be extended 
with new criteria with the help of the weaving methodology that 
we proposed in our previous article [6]. Our weaving approach 
facilitates the categorization and consolidation of different quality 
criteria proposed by various authors into one place under a single 
umbrella. The strategy we employed in our weaving methodology 
is flexible enough to integrate new criteria or new sources easily 
to our survey results. Correspondingly, the set of questionnaires 
provided for each of the criteria in our elicitation tool (see Figure 
2) is also flexible to amend the advent of new perspectives.
3.3 Step2: Refinement of Goals to 
Requirements (RM) 
In our requirement engineering context, the stakeholders are 
the requirement engineers working in various contexts such as 
security and risk analysis. Although, the quality attributes are the 
high level goals of the SRE methodology-to-be, their refinement is 
specific to the context of use as well as the stakeholders. 
Accordingly, we need to refine the quality criteria goals into 
requirements RM in order to characterize the SRE-methodology-to-
be. Due to the limitation of the space, we provide only two short 
examples of elicited RM. 
One of the elicited concerns of the stakeholder is regarding the 
completeness of the security to risk analysis. Therefore, the 
anticipated feature on the SRE-methodology-to-be was:  “The 
methodology should facilitate in performing sufficient security and 
risk analysis with respect to the threats concerning confidentiality, 
integrity and availability” This statement was devised upon our 
discussions with the requirement engineers working in security 
and risk analysis context. This high level quality goal pertains to 
the adequacy quality criterion (C10 in Figure 2), which we refined 
as “The SRE-Methodology-to-be should facilitate in eliciting and 
capturing security and risk assessment information related to 
fetching the information from the on-board aircraft network” 
(RM1.1 in Figure 3).  
We have used the KAOS goal modelling notation [3] to 
represent the goals refinement hierarchy, for the obvious reasons 
that our evaluation methodology follows a pure goal-based 
approach for eliciting requirements (RM) of the SRE-Methodology-
to-be. In addition, KAOS facilitates in tracing the refined goals. 
The first stage of the refinement regards customizing the 
anticipated characteristic definitions to the target context (RM1.1 
in Figure 3). This initial refinement activity is similar to the 
“attributes profiling” of the SABSA framework. The following 
refinements are driven based on the stakeholder’s expectations on 
the SRE-methodology-to-be. Accordingly, the RM1.1.1 RM1.1.2 and 
RM1.1.3 (in Figure 3). 
No
Abstract criterion abstract 
definition
Criterion Names in use
QUESTIONAIRES
To what extent does the SRE methodology facilitate?
C2
Compatible, non-
contradictory 
requirements
Consistent 1) Does it allow to verify the conflicts between the
requirements, goals, assumptions and the domain 
properties?
C3
Accomplishable within 
the given financial, time, 
legal, technical 
constraints
Feasible/affordable
legal
Achievable
1) Does it allow to capture all the constraints pertinent to
a security requirement? such as technical? Legal? Time? 
Financial? And time and costs of the implementation?
3) How long does it take to learn the methodology? Is it 
within the time constraints?
4) what are the training costs?  do they exceed the
financial constraints?
C5
Requirement should be 
able to refer back to its 
objective. Dependency 
or reference links 
between requirements 
should be explicitly 
defined.
Traceable,
Cohesiveness
Allocated, 
satisfied/qualified
1) Does it facilitate to trace the requirements to their 
source (e.g., goals, mission profile, operational 
scenarios, context of use, performance, effectiveness, 
person etc.)?
2) Does it allow to group the requirements under similar 
abstraction?
C10
Stakeholders needs are 
sufficiently expressed
Adequacy, 
Validatability
1) Does it allow to validate the sufficiency of the elicited
requirements?
2) Does it facilitate the explicit association of security and
risk analysis information with respective requirements?
3) Does it verify if each requirement is self contained with
no all the necessary assertions? such as 
preconditions/post conditions/invariants?
C11
Requirements defined 
are simple using 
common terminology 
and non-technical 
jargon.
Clear, Concise,
Comprehensibility,
Customer, User 
Orientation
1) Do the derived requirements are easily
understandable to the intended users? 
2) Does the methodology support to facilitate the
comprehensibility of the formal languages employed?
Figure 3: Sample of stakeholders’ objectives based on Adequacy 
Criterion 
Another elicited concern of the stakeholders corresponds to 
the understandable aspects of the security requirements. 
Respectively, this concern relates to the quality criterion 
comprehensibility, which roughly means that respective users 
should be able to easily understand the security requirements that 
are derived by the SRE-methodology-to-be. Therefore, the 
anticipated feature on the SRE-methodology-to-be was:  “Does the 
derived requirements by the methodology can be easily understood 
by all users who use them?” Figure 4 reflects the refined 
requirements (RM) related to the comprehensibility criterion. 
Figure 4: Sample of stakeholders’ objectives based on 
Comprehensibility Criterion 
This concern drives the main motivation for all the model 
based RE approaches. The reason is straight forward, a security 
requirement not understood cannot be analysed or implemented 
properly. In this regard, one of the factors influencing the 
comprehensibility is the language of the RE methodology itself. 
That means, which language is understandable to the users? A 
formal language? UML? Or a natural language? This aspect 
 
completely depends on the language familiarity of the 
stakeholders who are going to use the methodology. If they are 
familiar with formal notations then using formal languages is 
better. If they are familiar with UML, then it is better to choose 
the requirement engineering methodology accordingly. 
Furthermore, learning and mastering a new language has a cost in 
terms of both money and time as highlighted in the related 
works[12], [16]. This aspect is close to feasibility criterion. As 
consequence, one can also observe in Figure 4, that there is a 
dependency link with the between the refined characteristic goals 
of the quality criteria comprehensibility and feasibility. 
3.4 Step3: Evaluation of the SRE 
methodologies 
This step concerns the evaluation of the SRE methodologies. 
The resulting requirements RM elicited at Step2 will eventually 
become the evaluation criteria. In our research project context, 
evaluated three distinct SRE methodologies: Secure KAOS (a goal-
oriented methodology – noted KAOS) [3], Secure Socio-Technical 
System (an agent-oriented methodology – noted STS) [5] and 
Security Engineering Process using Patterns (a problem-oriented 
methodology – noted SEPP) [4]. Due to space limitations, we 
restrict our explanation with first the two steps of our 
methodology and therefore we do not provide details of the 
evaluation results. 
4 Discussion 
Our evaluation methodology implements a RE process to elicit 
characteristics of SRE-methodology-to-be. Unlike the other 
comparative study strategies, it allows the elicitation of SRE 
evaluation criteria according to the context of use. This flexibility 
was made possible with the help of the two pluggable building 
blocks: 1) our quality criteria list[6] and 2) the stakeholder’s 
objectives which allows dynamic customization of the context. 
Firstly, tight coupling of the quality criteria with 
consensus strictly forces to elicit requirements (RM) respecting 
the quality characteristics of good requirements. Since the 20 
quality criteria cover all the aspects of SRE process, the resulting 
requirements (RM) are not limited to elicitation only (issue A in 
section 1). Moreover, these 20 criteria result from the consensus 
of the works varying from research contributions to international 
standards such as ISO29148[17]. Therefore, they are not subjective 
(issue B in section 2.3). 
Secondly, tight coupling of the stakeholder views strictly 
forces to elicit context specific requirements (RM) complying with 
the requirement engineers’ objectives (issue C in section 2.3) 
confined to a business operational context. Accordingly, the 
elicited criteria are considered as high-level goals which are then 
refined with help of our elicitation tool (Figure 2). Therefore our 
approach provides an explicit explanation and affirmation of final 
RM (issue B. section 2). Altogether, these two building blocks of 
our RE based evaluation methodology contributes towards the 
adaptability as well as the reusability of our evaluation strategy 
irrespective of the security requirement engineering context. 
Likewise, the characterization of SRE methodology-to-be based on 
the quality criteria coupled with stakeholder’s objectives, 
contribute towards asserting the correctness and reliability of 
the derived evaluation criteria. 
To conclude, our requirement engineering based evaluation 
approach allows its users to think like a requirements architect 
who plans, designs and reviews the derivation of security 
requirements well before selecting an SRE methodology. As a 
result, it implies a significant focus on security requirements 
analysis right from the earlier stages of SRE process. 
5 CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
It is admitted that requirement engineering is an important 
activity, especially in the security process. However, choosing the 
good SRE method is still a complex task. Different comparative 
studies exist in the literature, however, they are all confined to a 
specific requirements engineering context. Furthermore, no 
comparative study so far has introduced the significant 
consideration of the security requirements engineers as the 
stakeholders who will use the SRE methodology. 
In this article, we proposed an evaluation methodology that 
facilitates the evaluation of SRE methodologies. Our principal 
motive in this article is to convey the fact that the evaluation 
criteria are context dependent and cannot be considered as 
generic.  We dealt with this issue in a similar manner as a 
requirements engineering problem. We elicited requirements 
from requirement engineers. This task was assisted by our unified 
list of 20 quality attributes. As consequence, we can derive 
evaluation criteria specific to a requirements engineering context. 
It is to note that this article mainly focuses on the derivation of 
evaluation criteria and not to perform a comparative study. 
However the resulting criteria can also be used to do a 
comparative study, if needed. 
For future works, we plan to propose refinement patterns to 
enhance the refinement process in step 1. For instance, when we 
refined the 20 quality attributes, we referred to some original 
definitions like [17], [21] for risk. In this regard, it would also be 
interesting to integrate refinement patterns referring to works 
like mayor’s work [7] that assists in refining risk related 
requirements with its 7 risk related concepts (risk, impact, event, 
threat, vulnerability, threat agent and attack method). Facilitating 
the access to such information will make the refinement of 
requirements RM easier. 
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